Turkey’s Dual Agendas: Stuck between oppression and “peace”
Two developments, one contradiction: The main opposition party remains under attack, as Ankara pledges reconciliation with the Kurds — a strange blend of anger and hope. What, really, is happening?
As the world plunges deeper into commotion and turbulence, Turkey follows — seemingly at double speed. Much of what unfolds on its domestic stage, however, remains underreported. Some of this can be blamed on the global distractions elsewhere. Yet the deeper reason lies in the sheer difficulty of deciphering the nature and trajectory of the developments within Turkey.
Described by many as a "civilian coup," the arrest of Istanbul’s mayor — and leading opposition figure — Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19 marked the regime’s opening move to block his challenge against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the elections three years from now. The immediate wave of social unrest it triggered was notable.
But those protest waves have since lost momentum. The authorities, deploying their familiar playbook, zeroed in on the movement’s dynamic core: students. Forty-six are now in jail, with hundreds more awaiting indictment — their academic futures left hanging in the balance.
Their families grow increasingly anxious, while the main opposition party, CHP, seems to have lost interest in defending them. “If attention toward them continues to fade, their time in prison will inevitably be extended,” columnist Tuğçe Tatari warned.
The regime, as expected, is playing for time — counting on exhaustion and fear. Crush the young first, and the older generations will think twice before taking to the streets.
Six weeks after İmamoğlu’s arrest, another crackdown sent shockwaves through Istanbul Municipality. In early morning raids on Saturday, April 26, police detained 51 senior officials, primarily from the Water and Sewerage Administration (İSKİ), on charges of “bid rigging,” “qualified fraud,” and “bribery.”
Özgür Özel, the leader of the CHP, reacted sharply. “There are two motives behind these arrests,” he said. “First, to seize the will of the people; second, to seize Istanbul’s profits. The moment Mayor Ekrem was imprisoned, they dusted off the Kanal Istanbul betrayal project. While Mayor Ekrem — the guardian of Istanbul — sits in Silivri Prison, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stars in commercials on Arab TV channels, advertising homes with views of Kanal Istanbul, lakefront properties, and real estate guaranteed with a Turkish passport, all packed into 3.5-minute ads.”
(Kanal Istanbul is a massive infrastructure project that would carve an artificial waterway between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, running parallel to the Bosphorus Strait. Marketed as a solution to relieve shipping congestion, critics slam it as an environmental disaster in the making and a blatant land-grab to benefit pro-government real estate interests. Following his election victory, İmamoğlu canceled key components of the project, drawing Erdoğan’s fury.)
The fresh wave of arrests signals that the regime has no intention of "softening" its stance, as some opposition-linked media outlets had hoped. Quite the opposite: reports indicate that prosecutors in Ankara and Istanbul are finalizing a sweeping new case — citing alleged irregularities — aimed at annulling the CHP’s 2023 party congress (which elected Özgür Özel as leader) and potentially installing a trustee over the party. May promises, therefore, to be a month of high political tension.
Meanwhile — and this is where Turkey watchers are left puzzled, if not deeply suspicious — President Erdoğan and his nationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, have succeeded in raising hopes among Turkey’s Kurds and their political party, DEM. Bahçeli calls it a “historic peace project”: in theory, it involves the PKK laying down its arms and dissolving, in return for "improved conditions" for its jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan.
In a stunning pivot, the regime’s narrative around Öcalan has transformed over the past six months — from branding him a "baby killer" to lauding him as a "founding leader." Appeasement appears to be working, at least for now.
Yet to much of Turkish society, the situation feels, if not surreal, incomprehensible.
In reality, Turkey is trapped in a kind of "collective schizophrenia," where two diametrically opposed developments unfold side by side: brutal oppression aimed at the main opposition on one hand, and pledges of "peace and democracy" offered to another major opposition bloc on the other.
How all this will add up, no one seems to know. Domestic pundits are confused, as two major opposition forces are being pushed into their own corners—divided: Kurds floating in a rosy bubble, the secular-centrist CHP up in arms.
Public debate is flooded with confusion, aggressive exchanges, and wild speculation. The polarized media is fully engaged, either spreading disinformation or retreating into self-censorship. The chaotic atmosphere, needless to say, is exactly the kind of terrain Erdoğan has mastered over the years to maintain control.
Yet nothing can disguise the anomaly that has gripped the country. As one of Turkey’s sharpest political observers, Professor Mustafa Erdoğan, put it:
“It is strange because pursuing these two agendas simultaneously aims to achieve opposing goals, and therefore is internally inconsistent," he wrote. "While the first agenda appears to seek peace and stability by resolving one of the country's major issues—the Kurdish question—the second agenda moves in the exact opposite direction, deepening and spreading social polarization and undermining the very foundations of peace and order.”
Bizarre or not, there may be an internal logic behind Erdoğan and Bahçeli’s strategy. Some Turkish analysts argue the duo are playing “good cop/bad cop,” or even that there are tensions within the ruling alliance. Yet in reality, no clear cracks have appeared in the power structures—at least, not yet. So, what is the strategy?
“For months, Turkey’s government has been trying to accomplish three major tasks simultaneously—or nearly so—in order to solidify its hold on power at home and enhance its influence in the broader region,” wrote Robert Pearson, a former U.S. ambassador to Ankara and a senior fellow with the Middle East Institute (MEI).
“Its three-pronged approach consists of: 1) crushing democracy and dismantling the political opposition in Turkey by bringing serious criminal charges against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul and a key figure in the main opposition CHP; 2) bringing Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party, the DEM Party, into a coalition in order to win the next national election and extend President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 22-year rule—essentially making him ‘leader for life’; and 3) leveraging its growing influence in Syria to neutralize Kurdish power both in the northeast and within the Syrian national government.”
Pearson rightly observes that “Trump will not criticize (Erdoğan’s) domestic anti-democracy measures. He will have to explain how Turkey plans to assist the Syrian government in achieving its top priority—stabilization—while staying aligned with American concerns for Syria’s recovery rather than focusing solely on Turkish interests.”
Meanwhile, Erdoğan likely calculates that the current dynamics—the rise of the far right across Europe, the West’s dependence on Turkey’s military role amid the Ukraine war, and the tariff chaos disrupting the global economy—will discourage the EU from applying any serious pressure on Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian drift.
Still, the risks for Turkey’s Kurds are substantial. So far, the so-called "peace process" remains little more than a series of cordial visits to Erdoğan’s palace and various ministries. The pro-Kurdish DEM Party has opted for a non-transparent stance, while there are no tangible signs that the government is taking meaningful steps to match its rhetoric.
“There is an ongoing process at the moment, but we observe that the state has not taken any of the necessary steps,” said Hüseyin Küçükbalaban, co-chairman of the Human Rights Association. While the state remains immobile, all eyes are now on whether the PKK will soon declare its dissolution. But, how the disarmament will be handled, what will happen to those at the top echelons of the PKK, whether or not any amnesty for those PKK members in jail will be declared, nobody knows. Will the so-called “process” lead to the acknowledgment of the decades-long Kurdish demands for collective rights, is an even bigger question mark.
In short, all cards remain on the table, feeding widespread suspicion. And as time passes, more Kurdish voices are being raised, underlining deepening mistrust.
Is this “process” serious? This question was recently put to İlnur Çevik, who once served as a senior advisor in Erdoğan’s palace. His response was sobering:
“What is happening right now doesn’t really look like a peace process,” he said. And when asked if there was an official roadmap or a working draft in Ankara, he replied:
“Keep searching, but you won’t find one. Just like the Dolmabahçe Process (the previous peace attempt between 2013 and 2015) ended in a major disappointment, the same thing will happen now. That’s the Turkish mentality: ‘Set the caravan on the road and fix it along the way.’”